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Despite the copious attention paid to John Rawls' political phi-
losophy, there are still important aspects of it that are not widely 
understood. One of the most important of these is his discussion of 
general reflective equilibrium. In the present paper, I will offer an 
interpretation of Rawls' philosophical project in which close atten-
tion is paid to the nature of general reflective equilibrium and the 
role that it plays in Rawls' theory. I will argue that a clear under-
standing of this idea supports the position that many of Rawls' 
critics, and some of his advocates (e.g. Rorty), have things exactly 
backwards. While many worry that Rawls ' philosophy is 
monological to the point of being anti-democratic,11 argue that it is 
dialogical to the point of overestimating the power of democratic 
dialogue. While many worry that Rawls equates justice and stabil-
ity,2 I argue that his account of justice is in tension with his account 
of stability. 
Political Liberalism vs. Justice as Fairness 
It is widely recognized that one must distinguish between 
Rawls' fundamental approach to political philosophy, "political lib-
eralism", and his conjecture regarding the most reasonable con-
ception of justice, "justice as fairness." When Rawls gives us po-
litical liberalism, he writes in the voice of a political theorist articu-
lating a way of approaching politics in democratic contexts given 
the fact of reasonable pluralism.3 When Rawls gives us justice as 
fairness, he writes in the voice of a citizen of a democratic society 
putting forth arguments in favor of a conception of justice that he 
hopes can find the support of all reasonable citizens. Political liber-
alism contains claims about the nature of democratic societies and 
a method for achieving a just and stable democracy. Justice as 
fairness is what Rawls comes up with when he attempts, as a 
citizen addressing other citizens, to engage in the sort of practice 
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that political liberalism calls for. Thus, political liberalism is more 
fundamental than justice as fairness. It addresses the specific prob-
lem of bringing about a just and stable democratic society that 
contains a plurality of reasonable comprehensive doctrines. 4 On 
the other hand, "justice as fairness" is "a particular account of 
justice" (Rawls, PL xxvii). 
Reflective Equilibrium 
At the heart of political liberalism is Rawls' concept of reflec-
tive equilibrium. Reflective equilibrium is defined as a state in which 
one's "principles and judgments coincide" after one has undergone 
a "process of mutual adjustment of principles and considered judg-
ments" (Rawls, Theory 20). In A Theory of Justice, the principles 
Rawls endorses, and the original position as a device of represen-
tation, are taken to be reasonable only if they fit with our funda-
mental normative conceptions and considered convictions in re-
flective equilibrium. In his more recent work, he has made it clear 
that the relevant equilibrium is "wide" and "general" reflective 
equilibrium. 
One's reflective equilibrium is said to be "wide" when one has 
"considered the leading conceptions of political justice found in our 
philosophical traditions.. . and has weighed the force of the differ-
ent philosophical and other reasons for them" (Rawls, Justice As 
Fairness 31). "General" reflective equilibrium is explain as follows: 
Think of each citizen in such a society as having achieved wide 
reflective equilibrium. Since citizens recognize that they affirm 
the same public conception of political justice, reflective equi-
librium is also general: the same conception is affirmed in 
everyone's considered judgments (PL 384). 
Clearly, more needs to be said regarding the idea of general, wide 
reflective equilibrium. This passage makes it sound as if general, 
wide reflective equilibrium is achieved when all citizens achieve 
wide reflective equilibrium and they all happen to agree on the 
same conception of justice. No conversation, democratic delibera-
tion, or reasoning in public forums is necessary. Is general, wide 
reflective equilibrium something formed discursively or is it just 
Rawls, Democracy, and Ideology 39 
something we get when our independent, monological reflection 
happens to line up, that is, when we all come to support the same 
political conception of justice? 
Ultimately, it is clear that Rawls' view on general, wide reflec-
tive equilibrium includes discourse among citizens. Rawls tells us 
that general, wide reflective equilibrium is "fully inter-subjective:" 
"that is, each citizen has taken into account the reasoning and ar-
guments of every other citizen" (PL 385). This reveals a great deal 
about Rawls' conception of general, wide reflective equilibrium. It 
is surprising to see this point made in only one sentence, and in a 
footnote at that, but nonetheless it is clear that general, wide re-
flective equilibrium is more than just the happy coincidence in which 
all citizens achieve wide reflective equilibrium and each supports 
the same conception of justice. The conception of justice that all 
affirm will be one they affirm after discourse including all citizens. 
Rawls calls his claim that the principles selected in the original 
position are the most reasonable ones "a conjecture" and admits 
that it may be incorrect (PL 381). He thinks that this conjecture 
must be tested by submitting it to the democratic evaluation em-
bodied in the pursuit of general reflective equilibrium, since "an 
orderly contest between them [conceptions of justice] over time is 
a reliable way to find which one, if any, is most reasonable" (Rawls, 
Public Reason 105). The reasonableness of justice as fairness 
"can only be shown by the overall success over time of the shared 
practice of practical reasoning by those who are reasonable and 
rational" (Rawls, PL 119). 
Thus, political conceptions of justice are to be assessed from 
the point of view of real people—not original position parties. As 
Rawls writes in "Reply to Habermas:" "it is you and I—and so 
all citizens over time" who judge the merits of the original posi-
tion and the two principles of justice (PL 383). "We as citizens 
discuss how justice as fairness is to be formulated." We discuss 
"whether the details of the set-up of the original position are 
properly laid out and whether the principles selected are to be 
endorsed" (PL 383). We also lay out competing conceptions of 
justice and scrutinize and discuss them. "All discussions are from 
the point of view of the citizens in the culture of civil society" 
(PL 382). 
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Rawls calls for us to engage in a democratic dialogue that 
seeks (but never fully attains) the goal of reaching a rationally 
motivated consensus—a consensus that stands as "a point at infin-
ity we can never reach" (PL 385). Thus, Rawls' scheme has the 
same sort of indeterminacy as Habermas,' which is to be over-
come by the same means (Habermas, Between Facts and Norms). 
Rawls and Habermas share a common pragmatist criterion for the 
society we ought to work toward. The society we ought to work 
toward is the one that we would endorse after an idealized form of 
reason exchange in hospitable circumstances. Instead of a position 
behind a veil of ignorance, we should see Rawls as calling for real 
people to exchange reasons and arguments in a democratic dia-
logue that takes place in definite historical conditions and aims at 
general, wide reflective equilibrium. 
Implications for evaluating Rawls' theory 
What is the significance of the interpretation that I am offer-
ing with regard to the evaluation of Rawls' philosophy? If you 
accept my interpretive argument, then you will agree that Rawls 
does not equate justice and stability and is not monological to the 
point of being anti-democratic. The criticism that Rawls is overly 
monological derives from a failure to recognize that justice as 
fairness is offered by Rawls, the citizen, and it is to be counted as 
reasonable (for us) only if it finds support in general, wide reflec-
tive equilibrium. Once we see that Rawls' conjecture about which 
principles of justice are most reasonable is to be tested by a 
democratic dialogue in which "all citizens" take into account "the 
reasoning and arguments of every other citizen," this criticism is 
sufficiently answered (PL 383, 385). The criticism that Rawls 
equates justice and stability derives from a failure to distinguish 
the goal of seeking general, wide reflective equilibrium from the 
more modest goal of finding an "overlapping consensus" of com-
prehensive doctrines. Rawls contends that a society is just insofar 
as it is governed by a political conception that would be accepted 
after the idealized democratic dialogue required in the pursuit of 
general reflective equilibrium. However, a society can be stable 
merely in virtue of the existence of an overlapping consensus of 
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comprehensive doctrines. That is, stability requires only that a 
political conception be widely accepted (for the right reasons) (PL 
144), but justice is defined in terms of a standard of hypothetical 
acceptability. 
Justice, Ideology, and Democracy 
I have argued for a reading of Rawls on which he is exonerated 
from both the objection that he is anti-democratic and the objection 
that he equates justice and stability. However, in addition to an-
swering objections to Rawls' philosophy, my reading also raises new 
ones. For instance, we now must ask why we should think that a 
society would move toward greater justice as it approaches gen-
eral, wide reflective equilibrium. Is reflective agreement by the rea-
sonable citizens of a society enough to establish that a state is as 
just as we can make it? Why should we think that the conception of 
justice that is supported in general, wide reflective equilibrium is the 
one that does the best job of capturing what justice requires? 
Rawls' belief that this is the case presupposes a certain demo-
cratic optimism. The idea is that the best we can do in the project 
of moving toward a just government is to increase democratic dia-
logue between reflective citizens. The hope that reflection will lead 
a society toward greater justice rests on the deep assumptions that 
human reason, under liberal democratic traditions, will be self-re-
flexive and progressive. Citizens will be led to reason in good faith 
following what Habermas calls the "the force of the better argu-
ment," and this process of reasoning will be directed not only to-
ward decisions between conflicting choices within liberal thought 
(such as how to adjust tax rates, and whether or not the death 
penalty is just), but also at evaluating the dominant self-concep-
tions of our society and our fundamental liberal ideals. The hope is 
that citizens will interrogate and scrutinize even their most deeply 
held judgments and world-pictures. 
This is an attractive ideal, but it is clear that this optimism is 
unwarranted unless the state takes an active role in combating the 
tendency human beings have to see the status quo as just, and to 
refrain from interrogating their deep normative conceptions. One 
important question is how we are to get citizens to reason in this 
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way given the great political virtue it would require. Furthermore, 
we have reason to wonder how successful even the disciplined 
citizens will be at overcoming ideological distortion and other idio-
syncrasies of their socio-historical position. 
In the original position, the veil of ignorance limits inputs, but 
the original position is just a device of representation. In pursu-
ing general reflective equilibrium it is real people who construct 
their own reflective equilibria and then engage in a democratic 
discourse with the virtue of public reason. In the original posi-
tion, history, class, and other contingencies are largely filtered 
out, but in public reasoning these contingencies of socially and 
historically situated subjects are not. Thus, the conception of jus-
tice that emerges in general, wide reflective equilibrium will be 
partially determined by these contingencies. The clear fact that 
the basic structure will have a major impact on the inputs that 
citizens bring to the pursuit of reflective equilibrium builds a mea-
sure of conservatism into a theory that seeks to define the rea-
sonableness of principles of justice in terms of reflective equilib-
rium. When citizens reason in accordance with the "wide view" 
of public reason, 5 some of what enters into discourse will be a 
product of socialization, or be motivated from class interest, etc. 
Even if citizens live up to the duty of public reason, they will 
inadvertently bring in positions partially determined by irrational 
factors. 
As a deliberative democratic theorist, Rawls must confront 
"the problem of ideology," which I will state in following way. If 
the thoughts, beliefs, and values of the citizens of a society are 
distorted by the power relations and socio-economic factors of 
their time, then how can these beliefs and values serve as inputs in 
a democratic dialogue the result of which is a just government? If 
the inputs into democratic discourse are tainted, how can they be-
come "cleansed" in such a way that the outcome of the discourse 
grounds a just government? The political conception that fits in 
general, wide reflective equilibrium must not be determined by the 
institutions that are to be justified by this equilibrium. The institu-
tions will no doubt have some influence on the public culture, but 
how much is too much? At what point is democratic justification a 
mere feedback loop and only for show? 
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I have always thought that "the problem of ideology" has a 
frightening feel of inescapability, but it seems that our only hope for 
overcoming ideological distortion is critical reflection and discourse. 
We must embrace the democratic optimism involved in hoping that 
robust democratic discourse can allow "the force of the better 
argument" to triumph over the powers of socialization and class 
interest. Of course robust discourse could break up ungrounded 
assumptions and prejudices, but one might still worry that the out-
come of the deliberation will be largely determined by social condi-
tions, currently inculcated political ideals, current relations of pro-
duction, etc. In order to work against this tendency, the state must 
actively work to encourage criticism and scrutiny of the inputs into 
discourse. This would require fostering a certain kind of critical 
democratic culture, and this is where Rawls' account of justice is 
in tension with his account of stability. The conflict arises because 
in Rawls' discussion regarding how to achieve a stable society, he 
recommends that citizens be "educated" to fundamental liberal ideals 
in order to shape their doctrines toward the governing conception 
of justice (PZ,71,389). 
Rawls not only acknowledges that the basic structure of a 
society dramatically affects the individuals that live under it, he 
relies on this fact in his account of stability. Rawls indicates that a 
stable democratic society is to be achieved by having citizens live 
under a political conception, and life under that political conception 
is supposed to function to shape the fundamental normative judg-
ments of the citizens. He writes: 
[W]e hope that reasonable comprehensive doctrines affirmed 
by reasonable citizens in society can support it, and that in fact 
it will have the capacity to shape those doctrines toward itself 
(PL 389). 
We are to work out a conception of justice as freestanding, put it in 
place, and then hope that it finds the support of an overlapping 
consensus. Whether or not this occurs depends on the extent to 
which the conception of justice succeeds in articulating the shared 
ideals and normative conception of the society's citizens, and also 
on the conception's power to shape citizens' doctrines such that 
44 AUSLEGUNG 
the only doctrines that persist with significant adherents are those 
that support the conception of justice of the society. 
Thus, on Rawls' account, the stability of a liberal regime de-
pends on its ability to engender liberal values in its citizens. The 
institutions must imprint themselves on the minds of each new gen-
eration so that they will willingly consent to them. However, his 
account of justice depends on the power of open dialogue to break 
up false assumptions and stagnant thinking so that a society can be 
moved toward greater justice. If a stable democratic society is to 
depend on the inculcation of prevalent liberal values, then there is a 
significant threat of legitimizing existing injustices. 
If our public reasoning is going to be critical and reflective 
enough to move us toward greater justice, then it is necessary that 
the government work to engender robust argument about funda-
mental liberal ideals. Fundamental ideals must not be inculcated; in 
fact, they must be interrogated. Thus, it is clear that the issue of 
carrying out Rawls' project for a stable democratic society com-
petes with his project of an open dialogue progressing toward a 
more just society. 
Insofar as we allow existing conditions to shape the thinking of 
citizens, we threaten making the process of seeking equilibrium too 
conservative. We must guard against the tendency for political 
values and ideas to flourish on inertia. In the face of "the problem 
of ideology" we have no attractive choice but to embrace the demo-
cratic optimism involved in hoping that the force of the better argu-
ment can penetrate ideological distortion and agitate the human 
tendency to leave well enough alone. However, it must be recog-
nized that insofar as we attempt to reach agreement on shared 
traditions we are increasing the risk that existing injustices will 
escape scrutiny. 
Notes 
1 The critics who claim that Rawls is overly monological suggest 
that he decides things in advance for us with his original position and 
leaves no room for open democratic dialogue. As John Dryzek 
writes, discursive procedures "differ from those advanced by Kant 
and Rawls, which require only that the isolated individual engage in a 
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thought experiment" (Dryzek 17). The claim is that Rawls decides 
what justice requires by reflecting arm-chair-style, as a philosopher, 
while the dialogical theorist requires that we carry out actual demo-
cratic dialogue in order to determine this. See also Weitman 1995. 
2 Habermas suggests that Rawls intends to "collapse the dis-
tinction" between a conception's "justified acceptability" and its 
"actual acceptance" (Reconciliation 122). Wingenbach suggests 
that Rawls "jettisons justice as a substantive issue" in favor of 
showing us how to have a stable democratic society (Wingenbach 
220). See also Alejandro 1996, Pettit and Kukathas 1990, Rorty 
1990, Hershovitz2000. 
3 The fact of reasonable pluralism is the fact that reasonable 
people will disagree on fundamental questions even after free dis-
cussion; no amount of discourse can bring all reasonable citizens to 
affirm the same comprehensive doctrine. 
4 A comprehensive doctrine is a collection of beliefs and val-
ues held by a person. Comprehensive doctrines include beliefs and 
values that are political, religious, moral, scientific, etc. 
5 The wide view of public reason marks a loosening of the 
restrictions on the use of one's comprehensive doctrine in the pub-
lic forum. While on the "inclusive" view Rawls required any argu-
ments in terms of comprehensive doctrines to be more effective 
than arguing otherwise, now he only requires that such arguing be 
done in good faith that public reasons can and will be given in 
support of the position advocated. 
(PL,li-lii) 
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